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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
was denied recovery not only because he failed to prove the iden-
tity of the person involved, but also because of the lack of proof
that care by the defendant hospital was disregarded in the selec-
ton of whoever was the administering nurse.22
Judge Froessel, dissenting, argued that even though a hos-
pital's failure to carefully select a duly qualified (i. e. registered)
nurse may be the only basis of liability in the usual case, a dif-
ferent situation arises when other than duly qualified personnel
are selected to perform a medical act. The mere fact that a
person is an undergraduate nurse is insufficient to presume her
competence.23 Therefore, the dissent felt that the defendant
should have the burden of justifying the selection of a student
nurse when harm results.
The dissent in the instant case recognizes that changes in eco-
nomic and social conditions may have invalidated the original pol-
icy considerations behind the immunities doctrine.
Foreseeable Consequences
I Plaintiff, in Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co.,24 suffered a
severe case of frostbite while a passenger on defendant's bus.
During the course of the trip, the driver stopped the vehicle and
left the door open for about fifteen minutes. Since no one could
get frozen feet when the temperature is above 32 degrees, it must
have been below freezing on the bus. Plaintiff, unknown to the
driver, had a heart condition which rendered her more susceptible
to frostbite than the average person in normal health.
The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that plaintiff's injuries did not come within the realm of
reasonable foreseeability. 5 The Court of Appeals, however, de-
termined that a jury could find that the -defendant had failed to
furnish reasonable heat to plaintiff and that as a result thereof,
she suffered frostbite." Judicial notice was taken of the then
effective Public Service Commission rule adopted pursuant to
22. "The plaintiff does not advance his case materially by fastening upon thedefendant a duty of diligent selection. The burden is still his to prove that the dutywas disregarded." Hamburger v. Cornell University, sIupra note 17 at 339, 148 N. E.
at 542.
23. See Howe v. Medical Art Center Hospital, 261 App. Div. 1088, 26 N. Y. S.2d 957 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd 287 N. Y. 698, 39 N. E. 2d 303 (1942).
24. 304 N. Y. 457, 108 N. E. 2d 606 (1952).
25. Owen v. Rochester-Penfield Bus Co., 278 App. Div. 5, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 137
(3d Dez't 1951).
26. The trial judge charged-"The test here is whether or not this bus companyfailed to furnish reasonable heat to the plaintiff." Since no exceptions were made tothis charge, it became the law of the case, I.rey v. Prudential Insurance Co., 286 N. Y.434, 440, 36 N. E. 2d 651, 654 (1941), and plaintiff was not deemed an abnormal
person.
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subdivision 14 of § 61 Public Service Law "23 Heating: Each
omnibus shall be heated when reasonably required for the com-
fort and safety of passengers." Furthermore, the court stated
that it is common knowledge that many people suffer from low
blood pressure and poor circulation.
Negligence has been defined as "any conduct, except conduct
recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others
against an unreasonable risk of harm."" The standard-of con-
duct which an actor is held to i that which an ordinary prudent
person would use under the circumstances i. e. reasonable care.2 8
As a general proposition, an actor's liability for negligence is
based upon the foreseeability of any harm resulting from the care-
less conduct."
Once the negligent conduct of the defendant is established, it
it well settled that an injured person can recover for all the harm
actually suffered. 0 Thus a defendant is liable for the consequences
of a negligent act, even if those consequences are more severe or
aggravated by a delicate condition of health.81
While the court merely applied general rules of negligence
in reaching the above result, the rationale behind the decision is
not very clear. Perhaps the court is arguing that since plaintiff
was considered a normal person, defendant's conduct was negli-
gent because it created an unreasonable risk to such an average
person.3 2 Inasmuch as it is "common knowledge" that many peo-
ple have poor circulation, the rationale may be that the frequency
of the occurrence of the abnormality is high enough to impose a
duty of care in regard to it.
Vicarious Tort Liability
The true basis of vicarious liability, where one person is held
liable for the acts of another, is said to be one of policy.33 A de-
liberate allocation of a risk is involved when the losses caused by
a servant are placed upon the master, because he is better able to
bear them and to distribute the costs.' -
27. RESTATEmEN, ToRTs § 282.
28. See Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HAzv. L. REv. 72, 88 (1942).
29. Poplar v. Bourjois Inc., 298 N. Y. 62, 67, 80 N:E. 2d 334, 336 (1948).
30. Poplar v. Bourfois Inc., supra note 29; See 1 COOLEY, ToRzs 140-141 (4th Ed.19.32).
31. McCahill v. New York Transpor.ation Co., 201 N. Y. 221, 94 N. E. 616
(1911); Tice v. Munn, 94 N. Y. 621 (1883); See PRossn, Tots 344.
32. See note 26 supra.
33. PNossa, To rs § 62.
34. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 Yk=. L. J. 106 (1916); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L J. 106 (1916); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Ad-
ministration of Risk, 38 YALE L J. 584, 720 (1929).
